

Disaster in Tuvalu

Teaching Guide

DURATION

30 mins preparation
2.5 hours simulation
60 min debrief

CONTEXT

Fictitious; loosely inspired by real dynamics

BEST FOR

Participants with an understanding of negotiation fundamentals who frequently work in situations of negotiating on behalf of others

TEACHING

2 round negotiation simulation followed by interactive debrief

TOPIC(S)

negotiating on behalf of others, mandates, principal-agent, interest-based negotiations

CONTENT

A cyclone struck the country of Tuvalu. An immediate relief package from the US is needed. In this two-round exercise for 6-7 parties, participants first assume the role of ministers (either on the US side or on the Tuvaluan side). Internally they negotiate instructions for their chief negotiator. In a second round, participants become the chief negotiator for their country, and they need to find an agreement following the instructions from the ministerial team.

1) One page overview

Disaster in Tuvalu is a two-round negotiation simulation to introduce concepts of crafting mandates and navigating the tensions inherent when negotiating on behalf of someone else. The simulation's structure allows participants to experience both **internal negotiations** (Round 1), where they must determine a mandate and formulate clear and effective instructions for a negotiator within their respective country teams, and subsequently **external negotiations** (Round 2) where participants switch their role and become the chief negotiators. They must come to an agreement based on instructions that were drafted by a different team.

At the heart of this simulation is Tuvalu's need for financial assistance to address immediate disaster relief and long-term climate resilience. The US has committed to providing aid. However, the timing of the event, just shortly before an important international climate negotiation, links discussions about providing immediate financial relief to the broader demands of establishing long-term disaster relief funding vehicles. Tuvalu aims to negotiate additional commitments for a new funding vehicle that addresses such losses and damages induced by climate related disasters. The US tries to limit any such connection. Together, the parties need to decide on

- Funding: how much money will be paid and for which purpose,
- Funding source(s): whether the funding will come from climate related vehicles or not,

- Linkage to Loss and Damages: whether at the upcoming multilateral climate negotiation there will be a discussion about permanent funding vehicles and recognition of responsibility for climate related losses,
- A press release: whether the parties will publish a press release, what it mentions and whether they will do so separately or together.

Additionally, China has extended an alternative aid offer, introducing geopolitical considerations into the negotiation process.

There two different options to run this exercise:

- *Option 1: People switch roles (recommended, but logistically more difficult)*
In round 1, participants are first assigned to the roles of ministers, tasked with creating a mandate for the Chiefs of Staff of their country's climate envoy.
In round 2, the same participants are then assigned to the role of the Chief of Staff to use the mandate from round 1 for negotiations (though receiving the instructions from a group they weren't part of).
- *Option 2: People maintain the same roles throughout (logistically easier)*
Different participants are assigned the roles of ministers and the Chief of Staff. The participants playing the ministers draft instructions in round 1 and brief their Chief of Staff. In Round 2, the Chiefs of Staff negotiate, while the ministers observe and can be consulted a maximum of 2 times by the Chief of Staff.

2) Summary of the exercise

A. Content & Logistics overview

Detailed Content overview

The parties & the rounds

Round 1: Internal negotiations between ministers

Tuvaluan roles	US roles
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Minister of Finance • Minister of Justice, Communications, and Foreign Affairs • Prime Minister's Chief of Staff 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Special Presidential Envoy for Climate (Climate Envoy) • Secretary of State • Secretary of the Treasury • President's Chief of Staff (optional role to adjust for unbalanced numbers)

For Round 1, each team is tasked with producing **negotiation instructions** for the Chief of Staff of the Climate Envoys, both of whom, according to the scenario, are already on their way to the negotiation. The instructions can outline priorities, strategic considerations, communication strategy, the desired outcome, the level of autonomy granted, etc.

Round 2: External negotiations between Chiefs of Staff to the Climate Envoy

Tuvaluan role	US roles
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Chief of Staff to the Tuvaluan Climate Envoy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Chief of Staff to the Tuvaluan Climate Envoy

For Round 2, the Chiefs of Staff are tasked with negotiating a comprehensive agreement.

The issues

The following items need to be discussed:

- **1: Total Amount of Funding:**
 - How much funding should be made available and for what purpose?
 - Will China provide some of the funding
- **2: Funding Vehicle**
 - Will the funding be disbursed as Official Development Assistance (ODA), via UN non climate funds, or via the Green Climate Fund?
- **3: Public Communication of the Results**
 - Will there be a press statement?
 - Will it be joint or separate?
 - What will it cover?
- **4: (CONFIDENTIAL) - Linkage to COP27**
 - Will there be some type of a commitment to support the Tuvaluan demands for Loss and Damages as an official agenda item at the upcoming COP negotiation?

Party descriptions

Tuvalu: The country overall

Tuvalu enters the negotiation with a clear priority to secure immediate financial assistance. Specifically, it aims to obtain \$175 million immediate funding. In addition, it aims to link the current disaster to the broader need of creating a financial architecture to help countries deal with climate related losses. Hence, it prefers that funding is disbursed from climate related funding vehicles, and it wants assurances that at upcoming multilateral negotiations there will be a dedicated agenda point, including an institutionalized L&D funding vehicle within the global climate framework. The link to L&D emphasizes the historical responsibility of high-emission countries in causing climate change, thus framing the negotiation as a moral and climate justice issue. While Tuvalu is prepared to strategically leverage China's offer of financial support as a bargaining chip, it is keenly aware of the geopolitical risks associated with Beijing's strategic investments in the Pacific and seeks to avoid over-reliance on Chinese funding. However, if no alternative emerges, Tuvalu is willing to accept Chinese support to ensure the essential recovery and adaptation measures are funded.

Tuvalu: Differences within the country

Meanwhile, various members of the Tuvaluan delegation prioritize different aspects of this strategy. The Prime Minister's Chief of Staff is focused on securing the full \$175 million package, potentially from a mix of funding sources, while keeping diplomatic options open. The Finance Minister and Special Climate Envoy aim to ensure a significant portion of the aid comes through the GCF, and are trying to reinforce Tuvalu's long-term push for a dedicated L&D mechanism. Lastly, the Minister of Justice, Communications, and Foreign Affairs is particularly concerned with the public messaging of the agreement, ensuring it reflects Tuvalu's leadership in climate advocacy without compromising future negotiations.

United States: The country overall

The United States navigates geopolitical objectives, its assertion of climate leadership, balancing this ambition with its fiscal and political constraints. Specifically, it is open to provide financial support to Tuvalu but aims to minimize any connection of providing funding to broader climate discussion. The U.S. aims to constrain its commitments to a combination of Official Development Assistance (ODA) and non-climate humanitarian funds, strategically avoiding the establishment of a precedent that can be invoked at a later stage. Moreover, the US aims avoid a connection to Loss and Damage (L&D), a highly contentious issue. The US long-standing opposition to discuss L&D in multilateral negotiation is rooted in its fear that acknowledging a historical responsibility might lead to discussions about legal obligations for any type of climate induced event, and broader financial obligations to vulnerable countries. Publicly, the U.S. wishes to portray the outcome as a testament to a successful partnership with Tuvalu, emphasizing its dedication to global climate action while maintaining its long-term policy stance. Sensitive to China's involvement, the U.S. perceives it as a threat to its regional influence and strategic interests in the Pacific

United States: Differences within the country

Within the administration, the U.S. Special Climate Envoy is focused on presenting the agreement as a diplomatic success without formally acknowledging liability for climate damage. The Secretary of Treasury prioritizes budgetary constraints, ensuring any aid package remains within politically viable boundaries. Viewing this through the lens of U.S. foreign policy, the Secretary of State highlights the importance of maintaining influence in the Pacific and encouraging Tuvalu to decline China's offer. Meanwhile, the Chief of Staff to the U.S. President plays a critical role in aligning the final agreement with the administration's broader climate agenda, ensuring it avoids unintended domestic or international repercussions.

Party snapshot – Country Level

Party	Priority	Interests
Tuvalu (Small Island Developing State; Highly Vulnerable to	Secure \$175 million in aid through climate financing mechanisms (preferably GCF). Push for Loss and Damage	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ensure immediate disaster relief and long-term climate adaptation. Strengthen climate justice narratives, pressuring high-emission countries for climate reparations.

Climate Change)	funding to be formally recognized at COP27.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maintain diplomatic independence while using China as leverage. • Avoid complete reliance on China to prevent future dependencies.
United States (High-income country; Key Player in Global Climate Negotiations)	<p>Provide financial aid but limit explicit L&D commitments.</p> <p>Oppose framing aid as climate reparations.</p> <p>Block China's influence in the Pacific</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maintain climate leadership while managing domestic constraints. • Avoid legal precedents that could lead to future compensation claims from other vulnerable nations. • Ensure aid aligns with foreign policy objectives, preventing Tuvalu from moving closer to China. • Balance fiscal responsibility while upholding commitments to climate-vulnerable nations.

Party snapshot – Individual Level

Party	Priority	Underlying interests
Tuvalu		
Chief of Staff to Tuvalu PM	Secure \$175 million through any available means, even if it requires accepting China's offer.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prioritize full funding, willing to explore multiple sources. • Maintain Tuvalu's sovereignty while leveraging diplomatic ties • Ensure rapid fund disbursement to address immediate crisis needs.
Tuvalu Special Climate Envoy & Minister of Finance	Secure as much funding as possible through GCF, avoiding reliance on bilateral aid alone.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reinforce the L&D agenda at COP27, using the deal as a precedent. • Establish climate finance as a long-term mechanism for future. • Emphasize climate justice to build support from vulnerable nations.
Tuvalu Minister of Justice, Communications, and Foreign Affairs	Ensure strong public communication and frame the negotiation as a climate justice victory.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Position Tuvalu as a leader in global climate advocacy. • Maximize international media coverage to pressure the U.S. • Secure a joint press statement emphasizing L&D without legal liability.
United States		
Chief of Staff to U.S. Climate Envoy (John Kerry)	Structure the funding agreement in a way that avoids legal liability while demonstrating U.S. leadership.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ensure aid not framed as reparations to prevent future fiscal exposure. • Contain China's growing influence in the Pacific. • Shape U.S. public messaging to emphasize climate action while protecting domestic interests.

U.S. Secretary of the Treasury (Finance Minister)	Limit financial commitments while ensuring Tuvalu remains within the U.S. strategic sphere.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Keep funding under \$175 million; mix of ODA and non-climate funds. • Avoid Congressional pushback on excessive climate commitments. • Ensure that the aid does not set a precedent for future L&D claims.
U.S. Secretary of State	Use diplomatic leverage to ensure Tuvalu does not align with China.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strengthen U.S.-Tuvalu ties • Ensure diplomatic control over climate funding discussions. • Promote alternative to L&D framing; emphasize shared responsibility. • Maintain regional stability; Prevent China from gaining ground.
Chief of Staff to the U.S. President (optional role)	Ensure the final deal aligns with broader U.S. foreign policy and climate commitments.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maintain U.S. credibility in climate diplomacy • Ensure that climate negotiations do not trigger legal/financial liabilities. • Frame agreement as victory for climate leadership; avoid controversies

Logistics overview

This exercise has a **high logistical load**, especially Option 1, which is the recommended way of running the exercise. The instructor should spend ample time in advance planning the exact logistics and how to administer the transitions between negotiation rounds. The most complicated aspect in running the exercise is to reassign the instructions. For instance, if in Round 1 there were two separate US teams (US team 1 and US team 2) and two separate Tuvaluan teams (Tuvalu team 1 and Tuvalu team 2), then the written instructions must be redistributed. The people in US team 2 will receive the instructions that have been drafted by US team 1 and vice versa. The same happens for participants in Tuvalu. Subsequently, for Round 2, pairs across Tuvalu and the US have to be created for the bilateral negotiations. The details are outlined below (see *How to run and debrief the exercise*).

B. Learning Objectives

Analytical capacities

Participants will:

- Appreciate the tensions that arise when **negotiating on behalf of others (organizations or countries)**.
- Identify **typical challenges in crafting and/receiving mandates/instructions**, especially with regards to how to communicate preferences about issues, the authority to commit, the authority to communicate, and how such choices affect the capacity of negotiations to create value.
- Appreciate the different dynamics in **positional and interest-based bargaining**.

- Understand the importance of **value creation in negotiations** in seeking to achieve mutually satisfactory outcomes and practice techniques to create value.

Skills

Participants will practice:

- **Designing clear and effective mandates** that balance domestic political considerations with international negotiation goals.
- **Navigating challenges in repeated negotiations**, where instructions evolve across multiple rounds.
- Identifying **barriers to value generation** and crafting negotiation strategies that overcome them.
- **Differentiating between positions and underlying interests**, using problem-solving techniques to generate viable solutions.
- **Building coalitions** and managing cross-border relations, ensuring alignment between diplomatic strategy and policy goals.
- **Creating an environment conducive to creative problem-solving**, particularly in multi-party, high-stakes negotiations.

C. Where does this exercise fit in the negotiation syllabus

This exercise is useful either for experienced negotiators or to introduce a special topic in negotiations after participants have mastered fundamental concepts. It can also be ran with beginners, though the teaching and debrief should be adjusted to focus more on the bargaining dynamics themselves rather than the way by which the design of the instructions affected the negotiation in Round 2.

3) How to run and debrief the exercise

A. Logistics

There are two different ways of running the exercise.

There two different options to run this exercise:

- *Option 1: People switch roles (recommended, but logistically more difficult)*
In round 1, participants are first assigned to the roles of ministers, tasked with creating a mandate for the Chiefs of Staff of their country's climate envoy.
In round 2, the same participants are then assigned to the role of the Chief of Staff to use the mandate from round 1 for negotiations (though receiving the instructions from a group they weren't part of).
- *Option 2: People maintain the same roles throughout (logistically easier)*
Different participants are assigned the roles of ministers and the Chief of Staff. The participants playing the ministers draft instructions in round 1 and brief their Chief of Staff. In

Round 2, the Chiefs of Staff negotiate, while the ministers observe and can be consulted a maximum of 2 times by the Chief of Staff.

Here an overview of the logistics for the exercise for a **hypothetical case of 13 participants**.

Option 1: People switch roles

Step 1: Participants are assigned to the various roles for Rounds 1 and Round 2

In this case, 4 negotiation teams will be generated for Round 1 (see the table below).

People	Team and role for Round 1	Role for Round 2
Participant 1 Participant 2 Participant 3	Tuvalu team 1 Minister of Finance Minister of Justice, Communications, and Foreign Affairs Prime Minister's Chief of Staff	Tuvaluan Chief of Staff to the Climate Envoy Tuvaluan Chief of Staff to the Climate Envoy Tuvaluan Chief of Staff to the Climate Envoy
Participant 4 Participant 5 Participant 6	Tuvalu team 2 Minister of Finance Minister of Justice, Communications, and Foreign Affairs Prime Minister's Chief of Staff	Tuvaluan Chief of Staff to the Climate Envoy Tuvaluan Chief of Staff to the Climate Envoy Tuvaluan Chief of Staff to the Climate Envoy
Participant 7 Participant 8 Participant 9 Participant 10	US team 1 Special Presidential Envoy for Climate (Climate Envoy) Secretary of State Secretary of the Treasury President's Chief of Staff (optional role to adjust for unbalanced numbers)	US Chief of Staff to the Climate Envoy US Chief of Staff to the Climate Envoy US Chief of Staff to the Climate Envoy US Chief of Staff to the Climate Envoy
Participant 11 Participant 12 Participant 13	US team 2 Special Presidential Envoy for Climate (Climate Envoy) Secretary of State Secretary of the Treasury	US Chief of Staff to the Climate Envoy US Chief of Staff to the Climate Envoy US Chief of Staff to the Climate Envoy

Step 2: Participants prepare receiving 3 different instruction documents

The exercise contains various levels of instructions:

- **General instructions** (Document: 'Negotiation instructions for all parties'): identical for all parties. General instructions describe the overall scenario, the discussion points, etc.
- **Country specific instructions** (Document: 'Negotiation instructions for [US or Tuvalu] negotiation team'): private instructions for the different country teams. E.g., all Tuvaluan roles receive the Tuvaluan country instructions, which are written as a memo addressed to the Tuvaluan Committee to Draft Negotiating Instructions.
- **Role specific instructions** (Document: 'Role instructions for ...'): private instructions for each role. E.g., the Tuvaluan Minister of Finance will receive instructions for their eyes only.

Example:

Participant 11 who plays the role of the US Special Presidential Envoy for Climate would receive the following documents:

- Negotiation instructions for all parties
- Negotiation instructions for the US negotiation team
- Role instructions for US Special Climate Envoy

Step 3: Round I negotiations: Participants work in teams to draft instructions

It has been helpful in the prior running to have participants use an online document (e.g., Google Docs) to draft instructions and to have created an empty document in advance which they can use to jointly draft their instructions.

People	Roles	Round I outcome
Participant 1 Participant 2 Participant 3	Tuvalu team 1 Minister of Finance Minister of Justice, Communications, and Foreign Affairs Prime Minister's Chief of Staff	Tuvalu 1: Negotiation instructions for Chief of Staff
Participant 4 Participant 5 Participant 6	Tuvalu team 2 Minister of Finance Minister of Justice, Communications, and Foreign Affairs Prime Minister's Chief of Staff	Tuvalu 2: Negotiation instructions for Chief of Staff
Participant 7 Participant 8 Participant 9 Participant 10	US team 1 Special Presidential Envoy for Climate (Climate Envoy) Secretary of State Secretary of the Treasury President's Chief of Staff (optional role to adjust for unbalanced numbers)	US 1: Negotiation instructions for Chief of Staff

Participant 11	US team 2	US 2: Negotiation instructions for Chief of Staff
Participant 12	Special Presidential Envoy for Climate (Climate Envoy)	
Participant 13	Secretary of State	
	Secretary of the Treasury	


Step 4: Reassign roles and have participants prepare for Round 2

All participants will switch roles for Round 2. They will become their respective Chiefs of Staff to the Climate Envoy.

For instance, the US Secretary of State for Round 2 will become the US Chief of Staff to the Climate Envoy. The Tuvaluan Minister of Finance will become the Tuvaluan Chief of Staff to the Climate Envoy. They will then receive the Negotiation Instructions from another drafting team.

For example: Participant 4, 5, and 6, who together drafted the instructions “Tuvalu 2: Negotiation Instructions for Chief of Staff” will receive the instructions “Tuvalu 1: Negotiation instructions for Chief of Staff” that have been prepared by participants 1, 2, and 3. The goal is for participants to have to negotiate based on instructions that have been crafted by others.

Below a graphical overview based on the example from above.



Step 5: Negotiation pairs are created between one party from Tuvalu and one party from the US

For the last round, any party from Tuvalu is paired with any party from the US. The US can be doubled up and negotiate jointly if there is a mismatch of numbers (though it is helpful if they used the same instructions).

Tip for administration:

In prior iterations it has been helpful to pre-create an online document that pre-assigns people to groups and provides links to an empty instruction document. Then a second sheet can be created that pre-assigns the instructions from Round 1 to the right participants for Round 2. Below is an example of the basic structure of such a document that can save a lot of time. The instructor can use any way to simply send the right links to the right people based on the structure below.

Round 1 documents

Tuvalu			US		
Group	Name	Link	Group	Name	Link
Group 1	Participant 1	Link to empty instruction doc (TU 1)	Group 1	Participant 7	Link to empty instruction doc (US 2)
	Participant 2			Participant 8	
	Participant 3			Participant 9	
Group 2	Participant 4	Link to empty instruction doc (TU 2)	Group 2	Participant 10	Link to empty instruction doc (US 1)
	Participant 5			Participant 11	
	Participant 6			Participant 12	
				Participant 13	

Round 2 documents

Role	Name	Instructions for Round 2	Role Round 2	Name	Instructions for Round 2
Tuvalu Chief of Staff	Participant 1	Link to empty instruction doc (TU 2)	US Chief of Staff	Participant 7	Link to empty instruction doc (TU 2)
Tuvalu Chief of Staff	Participant 2		US Chief of Staff	Participant 8	
Tuvalu Chief of Staff	Participant 3		US Chief of Staff	Participant 9	
Tuvalu Chief of Staff	Participant 4	Link to empty instruction doc (TU 1)	US Chief of Staff	Participant 10	Link to empty instruction doc (US 2)
Tuvalu Chief of Staff	Participant 5		US Chief of Staff	Participant 11	
Tuvalu Chief of Staff	Participant 6		US Chief of Staff	Participant 12	
			US Chief of Staff	Participant 13	

Option 2: People retain same roles throughout

There is a logistically simpler way to run this exercise that maintains the same teaching points, yet it's not as engaging as the first one. The key difference of this option is that people are only assigned one role that they maintain throughout the entire negotiation, rather than switching between Round 1 and 2.

Instead, the participants playing the ministers are responsible for drafting instructions in Round 1, at the end of which they brief their lead negotiator, the Chief of Staff to the Climate Envoy. In Round 2, the Chief

of Staff to the Climate Envoy negotiates, while ministers are silently present in the background, and are allowed to be consulted 2 times.

Step 1: Participants are assigned to the various roles for the exercise

For instance, using the same number of 16 negotiators, the following assignments are made.

People	Team and role for Round 1
Participant 1 Participant 2 Participant 3 <i>Participant 4</i>	Tuvalu team 1 Minister of Finance Minister of Justice, Communications, and Foreign Affairs Prime Minister's Chief of Staff <i>Round 2 negotiator</i> <i>Tuvaluan Chief of Staff to the Climate Envoy</i>
Participant 5 Participant 6 Participant 7 <i>Participant 8</i>	Tuvalu team 2 Minister of Finance Minister of Justice, Communications, and Foreign Affairs Prime Minister's Chief of Staff <i>Round 2 negotiator</i> <i>Tuvaluan Chief of Staff to the Climate Envoy</i>
Participant 9 Participant 10 Participant 11 Participant 12 <i>Participant 13</i>	US team 1 Special Presidential Envoy for Climate (Climate Envoy) Secretary of State Secretary of the Treasury President's Chief of Staff (optional role to adjust for unbalanced numbers) <i>Round 2 negotiator</i> <i>US Chief of Staff to the Climate Envoy</i>
Participant 14 Participant 15 Participant 16 <i>Participants 17</i>	US team 2 Special Presidential Envoy for Climate (Climate Envoy) Secretary of State Secretary of the Treasury <i>Round 2 negotiator</i> <i>US Chief of Staff to the Climate Envoy</i>

Step 2: Participants prepare receiving 3 or different instruction documents

The exercise contains various levels of instructions:

- **General instructions** (Document: 'Negotiation instructions for all parties'): identical for all parties. General instructions describe the overall scenario, the discussion points, etc.

- **Country specific instructions** (Document: 'Negotiation instructions for [US or Tuvalu] negotiation team'): private instructions for the different country teams. E.g., all Tuvaluan roles receive the Tuvaluan country instructions, which are written as a memo addressed to the Tuvaluan Committee to Draft Negotiating Instructions.
- **Role specific instructions** (Document: 'Role instructions for ...'): private to each role. E.g., the Tuvaluan Minister of Finance will receive instructions for their eyes only.

Example 1:

Participant 10 who plays the role of the US Secretary of State would receive the following documents:

- Negotiation instructions for all parties
- Negotiation instructions for the US negotiation team
- Role instructions for US Secretary of State

The Chiefs of Staff to the Climate Envoys only receive instructions for their country, and no role specific instructions (since their role specific instructions are being developed during the exercise by the ministers).

Example 2:

Participant 4 who play the role of the Tuvaluan Chief of Staff would receive the following documents:

- Negotiation instructions for all parties
- Negotiation instructions for the Tuvaluan negotiation team

Step 3: Round 1 negotiations commence with the lead negotiator observing for the first half

The ministerial teams negotiate with each other to come up with instructions. The Chief of Staff to the Climate Envoy can silently observe. After 30 minutes (or whichever time the instructor chooses), the negotiator may speak and will receive a briefing and/or written instructions about how they are supposed to negotiate. They may take notes.

Step 4: Round 2 negotiations between pairs (US Chief of Staff and Tuvalu Chief of Staff) commence with the ministers observing the negotiations and standing ready to consult their negotiator.

A bilateral negotiation between the Tuvaluan Chief of Staff to the Climate Envoy and the US Chief of Staff to the Climate Envoy commence. Their respective ministerial teams are silently observing in the background (see table below). However, each Chief of Staff is allowed up to 2 times to ask for a timeout and consult the ministers.

Round 2			
Negotiation group A			
Participant 4 Participant 1 Participant 2 Participant 3	Tuvaluan Chief of Staff to the Climate Envoy Silent in background Minister of Finance Minister of Justice, Communications, and Foreign Affairs Prime Minister's Chief of Staff	Participant 13 Participant 9 Participant 10 Participant 11 Participant 12	US Chief of Staff to the Climate Envoy Silent in background Special Presidential Envoy for Climate (Climate Envoy) Secretary of State Secretary of the Treasury President's Chief of Staff (optional role to adjust for unbalanced numbers) <i>Round 2 negotiator</i>
Negotiation group B			
Participant 8 Participant 5 Participant 6 Participant 7	Tuvaluan Chief of Staff to the Climate Envoy Silent in background Minister of Finance Minister of Justice, Communications, and Foreign Affairs Prime Minister's Chief of Staff	Participant 17 Participant 14 Participant 15 Participant 16	US Chief of Staff to the Climate Envoy Silent in background Special Presidential Envoy for Climate (Climate Envoy) Secretary of State Secretary of the Treasury

B. Draft schedule for running the exercise

Below a draft schedule for each option. This exercise has the advantage that it can be ran over multiple days of class sessions. It can be useful to have people draft instructions on one day, to distribute the instructions they wrote overnight, and to have Round 2 negotiations the next day.

Option 1: People switch roles

Time	Task
0:00-0:10	Introduction to exercise + Sharing logistical information
0:10-1:10	Round 1 negotiation: Ministers draft mandate for chief of staff
1:10-1:15	Assign chief of staff instruction documents to participants
1:15-1:40	Preparation based on new instructions
1:30-2:30	Round 2 negotiation: Chief of staff negotiation
2:30-3:30	Debrief

Option 2: People retain same roles throughout

Time	Task
0:00-0:10	Introduction to exercise + Sharing logistical information
0:10-0:40	Round 1 negotiation, Part A: Ministers negotiation the mandate for the chief of staff (i.e., Chief of Staff must remain silent)
0:40-1:10	Round 1 negotiation, Part B: Ministers brief the chief of staff (i.e. Chief of Staff may ask for clarifications)
1:10-1:15	Transition to Round 2 (pairing of US and Tuvaluan Chiefs of Staff)
1:15-2:15	Round 2 negotiation: Chief of staff negotiation (with ministers observing/consulting)
2:15-3:15	Debrief

C. Suggested detailed lesson plan for debriefing

There are broadly two different dynamics that can be explored in the debrief. The instructor can choose to dive deeply into the relationship between the first round of negotiations (the drafting of instructions, and their design) and the second round, exploring how different types of instructions yielded different negotiation dynamics. Or they can focus much more on the negotiation dynamics in round 2 (i.e., discuss negotiation strategies, whether parties were able to come to a mutually satisfactory agreement, etc.). Which aspect to focus on depends largely on the preferences of the instructor and the needs of the group.

Below, we outline a debriefing plan that focusses on the first dynamic, i.e., the ways in which different types of instructions (Round 1) produce different negotiation dynamics. But there is ample scope to instead explore Round 2 in more detail or to combine these different approaches. The accompanying slide deck contains a few extra slides with questions that can be used to that end.

Debriefing plan overview

Time	Task
0:00-0:10	Open discussion of challenges in the exercise and the strategic approach of the different groups.
0:10-0:20	Short lecture/input on typical dynamics regarding how different instructions/mandates can produce highly positional dynamics or allow for more interest-based bargaining dynamics.
0:20-0:25	Open discussion of shortcomings and positive features of instructions received
0:25-0:50	Discussion of how to communicate substantive interests and positions in instructions, how to communicate information, what authority to commit to choose, and what authority to communicate to choose
0:50-1:00	Wrap

Detailed debriefing plan

a) Open discussion of challenges in the exercise and the strategic approach of the different groups.

The goal of the first part of the debrief is to surface challenges and tensions participants encountered in the second round of the negotiation simulation to start a lively discussion and to set the stage for deeper exploration in subsequent parts of the debrief.

Exemplary challenges mentioned by participants include:

- Unable to come to an agreement based on the instructions since there simply was not Zone of Possible Agreement (ZOPA) left for participants to agree if they followed their instructions faithfully.
- Instructions perceived as unrealistic wish lists, leading some participants to disregard them.

- Very hostile negotiation dynamics that felt like speaking across each other, since one party focuses on justice and fairness while the other views the issue as a financial one.
- Challenges in deciphering and disentangling the complex set of interests (especially technical vs. political), resulting in a process that feels like horse trading across issues.
- In Round 1, difficulty envisioning Round 2 leading to a dynamic whereby everyone focused on ensuring that their specific interest is reflected in the instruction rather than crafting a cohesive strategy that envisions Round 2. Round 1 felt more like coordinating individual desires rather than establishing a comprehensive strategic plan.
- In Round 1, confusion over decision-making authority that should be granted due to the mix of highly political and very technical issues.
- ...

The main goal of this section of the debrief is to identify the challenges faced, which will then lead into a brief discussion on how the internal negotiations from Round 1 can help address and mitigate these challenges in Round 2

b) Short lecture/input on typical dynamics regarding how different instructions/mandates can produce highly positional dynamics or allow for more interest-based bargaining dynamics.

The main goal of the short input is to sensitize participants for the way by which the instructions received by negotiators can strongly determine the subsequent negotiation dynamics.

It can be helpful for the instructor to briefly outline the differences between strongly positional dynamics in Round 2 and what a more interest-based/problem-solving approach could have looked like.

Looking at the positions of both parties across the issues (see slide deck), it becomes clear that there is little overlap. If parties simply note their positions across the various issues, this tends to produce dynamics of “negotiation tennis,” where one party gives a bit, the other gives a bit, etc. Participants will likely get deeply frustrated and emotions tend to run high as there is no or only a small ZOPA.

A different approach would have been for the negotiators understand the deeper interests of both parties and develop the joint question: How can we get enough funds flowing very fast with a commitment to increase funding for climate-related disasters while allowing for a multilateral discussion of climate related disaster but avoiding any implication that there is a legal liability by the US (& others) and without setting an inadequate precedent?

This latter question is much more difficult to answer, however, it crystallizes what the negotiation is really about and would allow for some joint work on developing options that might satisfy both parties better.

The point here is not necessarily to note that it’s always better to set up a negotiation as an interest-based problem, but that one can be deliberate in designing a process that tends to lead to positional or interest-based dynamics. In this case, the way by which instructions are written and designed tends to push negotiations in one or the other direction, yet most teams will not have deliberately thought about this in Round 1.

Optionally, the instructor can choose to illustrate the three layers of position bargaining (see slide deck), which illustrates that frequently internal negotiations are positional, there is a positional negotiation

between the external negotiator and their internal team, and a subsequent positional negotiation between the representative and the other representative. This process tends to give representatives the role of a partisan defender in the external negotiations, when in reality it is much more useful to employ them as co-mediators between the inside and the outside.

c) Open discussion of shortcomings and positive features of instructions received

Based on this input, the instructor can lead a short discussion asking about shortcomings and positive features of the instructions parties received. It can be helpful to either mentally or on a whiteboard start clustering the comments around four categories of typical problems that will guide the remaining discussion.

- **Unclear outcome:** What am I expected to generate? Understanding? Agreement? Several options?
- **Unclear information:** What are our governmental interests? How important is which issue? What are our alternatives? What is the actual problem this negotiation is trying to address?
- **Unclear authority to commit and unclear level of discretion:** May I commit? To what? Under which conditions? May I come up with new options if new information materializes? May I reorder priorities based on new information?
- **Unclear authority to communicate:** What information may I share?

d) Discussion of how to communicate substantive interests and positions in instructions, how to communicate information, what authority to commit to choose, and what authority to communicate to choose

The remainder of the discussion is designed around surfacing tensions and ideas about structuring effective mandates with respect to the substance, the desired outcome of the negotiation, the authority to commit, and the authority to communicate.

More detailed suggestions of positive considerations are noted in the accompanying slide deck. Below just an overview of key ideas and tensions for each of the categories:

- *Substance:* Focusing solely on settlement points can create an unrealistic high bar or encourage settling on agreements that merely approximate the target, rather than empowering negotiators to explore and develop options through interaction. To counter this tension, it is beneficial to clearly communicate the interests in instructions, especially in early stages of multi-round negotiations. Additionally, it's crucial to indicate the priorities prioritize over different aspects of an agreement, as a lack of this knowledge may lead representatives to treat all issues as being equally important, hindering their ability to identify which issues are more amenable to concessions.
- *Desired outcome:* Not specifying a clear outcome or being unclear often leads to a tacit expectation for the representative to reach an agreement, which presents a strategic challenge for representatives. While this can be advantageous (specifically, when an outcome is needed), most negotiations benefit from including stages that are specifically designed to develop multiple potential options. This approach expands the options space. It can be helpful rather than simply noting down settlement as the desired outcome, to strategically and

explicitly instruct agents to generate options as the desired outcome. Note that even in this negotiation simulation, this could have been employed as participants were aware of future negotiation rounds between the Climate Envoys.

- *Authority to commit.* Granting authority to commit interacts with decisions about the desired outcome. While having the power to commit can be crucial for reaching agreements, it also imposes a significant tactical burden on representatives, as their statements may be seen as commitment offers. Particularly in early negotiation stages, withholding full authority to commit can provide more flexibility and ease strategic discussions.
- *Authority to communicate.* Negotiators often tactically withhold information, which is sometimes necessary, especially concerning bottom lines and potential settlement points. It's typically safer to convey broader underlying interests. Additionally, depending on the negotiation stage, it can be advantageous to refrain from noting bottom lines in the instructions, particularly in multi-issue negotiations where the bottom line on one issue relies on agreements reached on others.

e) Wrap

There are various options to wrap up the discussion. In prior executions of the exercise, it often proved helpful to zoom out and paint a picture of how representatives can be engaged differently. Frequently, they are engaged “defenders of the government positions” who receive instructions on positions, the bottom line, and clear information of when to commit and what information to share. With that, negotiators are expected to enter any future negotiation with the tacit expectation of securing an agreement.

There is a very different way to engage a representative, namely as a supporter and co-mediator who helps uncover information, explores the interests of the counterpart, co-craft options internally and externally, and ultimately helps settle on one. Such a picture of a representative implies a very different mandate whereby instructions dynamically unfold along the various stages of a negotiation. Some examples of how to craft such a dynamically unfolding mandate are noted in the slide deck.

4) Additional Resources & Appendix

Additional Resources

For literature to delve deeper into the core concepts learnt through the simulation:

- Mnookin, Robert Harris, Lawrence Susskind, and Pacey C. Foster, eds. 1999. *Negotiating on Behalf of Others: Advice to Lawyers, Business Executives, Sports Agents, Diplomats, Politicians, and Everybody Else*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- Fisher, Roger, and William Ury. 1981. *Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

For more information about the background, context, and challenges around the issue:

- United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 2015. Paris Agreement. Paris: United Nations. Available at: <https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/the-paris-agreement>.

- UNFCCC. 2022. Loss and Damages Discussions and Options – COP27. Sharm El-Sheikh: United Nations. Available at: <https://unfccc.int/news/cop27-reaches-breakthrough-agreement-on-new-loss-and-damage-fund-for-vulnerable-countries>
- UNFCCC. Various Years. All Historical Mentions of Loss and Damage Text in UNFCCC Decisions. Available at: <https://unfccc.int/topics/resilience/resources/decisions-and-conclusions-about-loss-and-damage>
- V20 Group. 2022. V20 Climate Prosperity Recovery Agenda. Vulnerable Twenty Group (V20). Available at: <https://www.v-20.org/resources/publications/v20-climate-prosperity-recovery-agenda>.
- Government of Australia and Government of Tuvalu. 2023. Australia-Tuvalu Climate Migration Agreement. Canberra: Government of Australia. Available at: https://www.lemonde.fr/en/environment/article/2024/05/12/australia-and-tuvalu-finalize-historic-treaty-to-welcome-climate-refugees_6671151_114.html
- Wheeler, Michael A. 2000. "Negotiation Analysis: An Introduction." Harvard Business School Background Note 801-156, August. (Revised December 2014.). Available at: <https://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Pages/item.aspx?num=27426>
- Sebenius, James K. 2020. "What Roger Fisher Got Profoundly Right: Five Enduring Lessons for Negotiators." Harvard Business Review, July 27. Available at: <https://hbr.org/2020/07/what-roger-fisher-got-profoundly-right>.